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Non-technical summary
What is the optimal degree of income tax progressivity when both labour supply and
wages are endogenous, and households are heterogeneous in several dimensions? This
question is answered using a numerical combined micro-macro model. The micro part
features approximately 4600 individual households with varying wages and labour
supply reactions. The macro part includes sectoral collective wage bargaining and
involuntary unemployment. Thus the fundamental trade-off created by increasing
tax progressivity is captured. On the one hand, higher marginal tax rates distort
individual labour supply. On the other hand, higher tax progressivity has a wage-
moderating and unemployment-reducing effect under collective wage bargaining.
In this general setting, varying tax progressivity is implemented as a stepwise
one-percentage-point increase of the marginal wage income tax and a compensating
transfer to all working individuals, which keeps the public budget balanced. The
most important simulation results are the following:
• A welfare maximum is reached at a point where marginal income tax rates are
six percentage points above the initial level.
• The welfare gain at this point averages a moderate two euros per household
and per month.
• This average welfare gain is overshadowed by considerable redistributive ef-
fects, which range from a loss of more than 300 euros to a gain of almost 200
euros.
• Labour supply effects of higher tax progressivity are positive at the participa-
tion margin and negative at the hours-of-work margin. The net effect varies
by skill group; it is positive for the low skilled, but negative for the medium
and high skilled.
• At the same time higher tax progressivity reduces the unemployment rate. This
effect dominates, so that overall labour input to production (in wage-weighted
hours of work) increases.
• Higher labour supply elasticities lead to a lower optimal degree of tax progres-
sivity. More elastic wage curves or more elastic international capital supply
work in the opposite direction.
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Wie hoch ist der optimale Grad der Steuerprogression, wenn Arbeitsangebot und
Löhne endogen sind und sich Haushalte in mehreren Dimensionen unterscheiden?
Diese Frage wird mittels eines gekoppelten, numerischen Mikro-Makro-Modells be-
antwortet. Im Mikro-Modul bildet das Modell rund 4600 Haushalte mit unterschied-
lichen Löhnen und Arbeitsangebotsreaktionen ab. Im Makro-Modul finden sich sek-
torale kollektive Lohnverhandlungen und unfreiwillige Arbeitslosigkeit. So kann der
fundamentale Zielkonflikt bei der Bestimmung der Steuerprogression erfasst werden.
Einerseits verzerren hohe marginale Steuersätze das individuelle Arbeitsangebot.
Andererseits wirkt Steuerprogression bei kollektiven Lohnverhandlungen lohnsen-
kend und vermindert so die Arbeitslosigkeit.
In diesem Modellrahmen wird Steuerprogression als eine stufenweise Erhöhung
der marginalen Lohnsteuer abgebildet, wobei steuerzahlende Individuen mit einer
Anpassung des Freibetrags so kompensiert werden, dass das öffentliche Budget aus-
geglichen bleibt. Dabei ergeben sich die folgenden Simulationsergebnisse:
• Das Wohlfahrtsmaximum wird an einem Punkt erreicht, wo die marginalen
Steuersätze um sechs Prozentpunkte höher liegen als im Ausgangszustand.
• Der Wohlfahrtsgewinn beträgt dann im Mittel bescheidene 2 Euro pro Haus-
halt und Monat.
• Der mittlere Wohlfahrtsgewinn wird überschattet von erheblichen individuel-
len Umverteilungseffekten, die von einem Verlust von mehr als 300 Euro bis
zu einem Gewinn von 200 Euro reichen.
• Die Arbeitsangebotseffekte höherer Steuerprogression sind positiv in Bezug
auf Partizipation und negativ in Bezug auf die Anzahl Arbeitsstunden. Der
Nettoeffekt variiert je nach Qualifikationsgruppe: positiv für die Geringquali-
fizierten, negativ für die Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten.
• Gleichzeitig reduziert Steuerprogression die Arbeitslosenquote. Dieser Effekt
dominiert den Arbeitsangebotseffekt, so dass die makroökonomische Beschäf-
tigung (in lohngewichteteten Stunden) steigt.
• Höhere Arbeitsangebotselastizitäten haben einen geringere optimale Steuer-
progression zur Folge. Elastischere Lohnkurven und höhere internationale Ka-
pitalmobilität wirken in die entgegengesetzte Richtung.
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Abstract
Changing the income tax progressivity in labour markets with collective wage
bargaining generates a trade-off. On the one hand, higher progressivity distorts
individual labour supply decisions at the hours-of-work margin, on the other
hand, it reduces unemployment by exerting downward pressure on wages. This
trade-off is quantitatively assessed using a numerical model for Germany. The
model combines a microsimulation module, which captures the labour-supply
decisions of approximately 4600 individual households, and a macro (compu-
table general equilibrium) module, which features collective wage bargaining
and involuntary unemployment.
In the simulations carried out using this model, the optimal degree of tax
progressivity turns out to be higher than the one in the actual German tax
schedule. The optimum is located at marginal tax rates that are 6 percentage
points higher than the actual rates (combined with a transfer that balances
the public budget). The welfare gain from such a reform is modest, however.
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1 Introduction
When we analyse the economic effects of income tax progressivity, obtaining a full
picture is only possible if we take account of three different effects. First, tax pro-
gressivity is a means of redistribution, because average tax rates are higher for the
rich than for the poor. Second, the higher the marginal tax rates, the higher the
distortionary effects on individual labour supply decisions. Third, tax progressivity
changes the conditions for collective wage bargaining and affects the level of wages
and unemployment. In this paper I present an applied simulation model for Ger-
many, which allows for an integrated analysis of these effects possible and enables
us to derive the optimal degree of tax progressivity.
In the policy debate, the redistributive effect of income tax progressivity is clearly
dominating. Economists have traditionally emphasised the efficiency aspect. A high
degree of tax progressivity means high marginal tax rates at the upper end of the
income distribution. This leads to large labour supply distortions in the high-income
group and, as a consequence, decreases the overall scope for redistribution. Mirrlees
(1971) was the first to derive criteria for an optimal tax schedule, which balances
redistributive and distortionary effects (see Tuomala (1990) for a comprehensive
overview of the literature based on the Mirrlees approach). When translating these
criteria into a realistically quantified tax schedule we are, however, confronted with
three major problems. (1) Labour supply is not only flexible at the hours-of-work
margin, but also at the participation margin (this has been addressed by Saez, 2002).
(2) The income tax system covers households of varying composition, which leads to
incommensurable utility functions. (3) Individuals are not only heterogeneous with
respect to their earnings potential (as assumed by Mirrlees), but also with respect
to their leisure preferences, which also makes them difficult to compare.
These complications have led to the evolution of a second approach, which takes
household heterogeneity seriously in several dimensions and is less concerned with
the derivation of analytic optimality conditions. This approach is rooted in the
tradition of econometric labour supply estimation and microsimulation (Fortin et al.,
1993; Aaberge and Colombino, 2008; Ericson and Floot, 2009). The increase in
complexity caused by introducing flexible functional forms for the estimation of
utility functions comes at the expense of flexibility in the tax schedule. Rather than
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deriving local marginal optimality conditions (as in Mirrlees, 1971), the search for an
optimal system is restricted to a relatively small set of free parameters (e.g. stepwise
constant marginal tax rates). Bourguignon and Spadaro (2005) can be placed in this
tradition as well. They invert the problem, however, and ask which social welfare
function would produce the existing tax schedule as an optimal choice.
Both approaches described above remain within a partial labour market frame-
work: wages are fixed and there is no involuntary unemployment. Since the 1980s,
however, extensive research into non-competitive labour markets has shown that
tax progressivity has important effects on wage formation as well(Hersoug, 1984;
Lockwood and Manning, 1993; Holmlund and Kolm, 1995; Koskela and Vilmunen,
1996). Tax progressivity lowers the incentives for high wage claims and leads to a
downward pressure on non-competitive wages, which in turn reduces involuntary
unemployment.
Few attempts have been made to quantify the trade-off between the positive
effect of tax progressivity on wage formation and its negative effect on labour sup-
ply (Holmlund and Kolm, 1995; Sørensen, 1999; Boeters, 2009). These attempts
remain within an aggregate representative-agent approach and do not combine non-
competitive wage formation and the heterogeneity of individual households. This is
where the present paper comes into play. I use a consistent micro-macro simulation
set-up developed during the past few years (Böhringer et al. (2005); Arntz et al.
(2008); Boeters and Feil (2009)). In the microsimulation part, the model features
a discrete labour supply choice, where the parameters of the utility function are
estimated along the lines of van Soest (1995). The computable general equilibrium
(CGE) part features sectoral wage bargaining between trade unions and employers'
organisations, which results in wages that are above the market-clearing level, and
thus leads to involuntary unemployment.
In this paper I use this micro-macro set-up to determine optimal tax progressi-
vity. Performing counterfactual experiments with systematically varying tax sche-
dules, I find an optimal tax schedule with marginal tax rates that are a few percen-
tage points higher than the ones in the initial situation. This benchmark optimum is
determined without any welfare weighting, according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion
of potential compensation of the losers. Adding redistributive motives to the social
welfare function would drive the results towards even higher tax progressivity.
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The simulations also show that the welfare function is relatively flat around the
optimum. The welfare gain of a switch from the initial to the optimal point is no
more than 2 euros per person per month. In addition, the maximum point reacts
sensitively to assumptions about core parameters. In the sensitivity analysis it is
shown that the level of optimal tax progressivity is increased by a lower elasticity
of labour supply, by higher wage curve elasticity and by higher international capital
mobility.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the two modules of
the model  micro and macro  and their linkage are presented. Section 3 describes
the welfare calculations and Section 4 the scenarios to be implemented. Section
5 presents the main simulation results, followed by Section 6 with the sensitivity
analysis. Section 7 summarises and concludes. The appendix contains details of the
labour supply estimation that underlie the microsimulation module.
2 Simulation set-up
The model used in this paper to perform a numerical analysis of tax progressivity is
based on an integrated micro-macro set-up. The micro part of the model consists of
a discrete choice (DC) labour supply module with heterogeneous households. The
macro part is a multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of an
open economy with collective wage bargaining. The two parts are first presented
separately in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. In Section 2.3, I turn to the micro-macro linkage
and describe how consistent feedback loops are constructed. Arntz et al. (2008)
provides a more extensive discussion of the linked model.
2.1 Microsimulation of labour supply
At the basis of the labour supply module is the microsimulation model for Germany
by Buslei and Steiner (1999). This model combines a household income calculator
under the current German tax and transfer system and a DC labour supply estima-
tion of the van Soest (1995) type. Discrete labour supply options (which combine
the respective amounts of income and leisure) for all households are constructed
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using information from the German Socio-Economic Panel, GSOEP (see Table 3 in
the appendix).
In the DC setup, the utility of labour-supply option k for household j of type i
is a combination of a deterministic part, U¯ , which depends on a vector of individual
and alternative-specific characteristics, xj,k, and an additive stochastic error term,
εj,k:
Ui(xj,k) = U¯i(xj,k) + εj,k.
The distinctive feature of the logit approach is that the error term is assumed to be
independently standard extreme-value distributed. This makes it possible to derive
an explicit formula for the probability of preferring option k over all other options
l 6= k from a set m (McFadden, 1974):
P (Ui(xj,k) > Ui(xj,l)) =
exp(U¯i(xj,k))∑
m
exp(U¯i(xj,m))
, ∀l 6= k
Following van Soest (1995), the utility function U¯i is specified as a translog function
with coefficients Ai and βi, which capture the quadratic and linear terms respecti-
vely:
U¯i(xj,k) = x
′
j,kAixj,k + β
′
ixj,k.
Each option is characterised by the logs of disposable income and weekly hours of
leisure for men and women:
xj,k = (log(Ci(h
f
j,k, h
m
j,k)), log(T − hfj,k), log(T − hmj,k)),
where hf and hm are the working hours of the spouses and T is time endowment.
The coefficients Ai and βi include interactions between leisure, income and a num-
ber of household characteristics. Fixed costs of working are captured by constant
terms for specific labour-supply options. The coefficients are estimated separately
for couples, female singles and male singles from a sample of approximately 4600
GSOEP individuals (see Table 4 in Appendix A.1). A complete list of regressors and
the detailed estimation results can be found in Appendix A.2.
Given the estimation results, simulation of a counterfactual situation proceeds
along the lines of Duncan and Weeks (1998) and Creedy and Kalb (2005). Random
numbers are drawn from the extreme-value distribution, and only those consistent
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with the actual choice of the respective household are retained. In the subsequent si-
mulation, with changed disposable incomes for the individual labour supply options,
the optimal choice will change for a subset of these random numbers. In the initial
situation, each household chooses exactly one option, whereas in the post-reform
situation, we may end up with a genuine probability distribution over all options.
2.2 The CGE framework
The labour supply module is embedded in a computable general equilibrium model
of Germany (PACE-L). In this section, the main parts of the model are briefly
sketched. An extensive, algebraic model description and a summary of the data
sources used for calibration can be found in Böhringer et al. (2005).1
Private households
The model comprises three representative worker households, each representing the
aggregate labour supply of one skill type in the microsimulation module. This co-
vers all households with flexible time allocation and observable hours of work, which
constitute roughly 60% of total labour supply. The rest is captured by one residual
worker household with fixed labour supply. Finally, there is a separate capitalist
household, which receives all capital income and decides on consumption and in-
vestment according to the approach of Ballard et al. (1985). The utility function of
the capitalist household is calibrated to empirical saving elasticities. Worker hou-
seholds, in contrast, do not save. The structure of consumption is assumed to be
identical across all households.
Firms
In each of seven aggregate production sectors, a representative firm produces a
homogeneous output. The production functions are of the nested constant-elasticity-
of-substitution (CES) type, combining intermediate inputs, capital and labour of the
three skill types. For the value-added nest, we adopt the NNCES approach of Perroni
1An updated, complete model description is available upon request.
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and Rutherford (1995), which allows us to calibrate labour demand elasticities to
the set of estimated cross-price effects in Falk and Koebel (1997).2 Each individual
firm is assumed to be small in relation to its respective sector. All firms in one sector
interact through monopolistic competition, so that firms can exploit market power in
their individual market segment. Cost minimisation yields demand functions for the
primary factors of production and intermediate demand at the sectoral level. Capital
is mobile across sectors, and the domestic market for capital is perfectly competitive.
International capital mobility is imperfect. (See Section 6.3 for a sensitivity analysis
with respect to international capital supply.)
Wage formation
In the largest part of the labour market, i.e. the low- and medium-skilled segments,
wages are determined by sector- and skill-group-specific negotiations between em-
ployers' associations and trade unions. The bargaining outcome is generated through
the maximisation of a Nash function, which includes the objective functions of both
parties and their respective fallback options. In the model, the right to manage ap-
proach is adopted: Parties bargain over wages, and firms determine labour demand
on the basis of the bargained wage. The objective function of the trade unions is of
the insider type: value of a job minus value of the outside option. The latter in
turn is composed of two components, associated with the chances of finding a job
in another sector or remaining unemployed. The values of labour market states are
determined as weighted averages of incomes in the case of employment and unem-
ployment, where weights are computed from the probabilities of transition between
employment and unemployment (see Pissarides, 1990, for an overview of the search-
and-matching approach). Collective wage bargaining results in wages that are above
the market-clearing level, with involuntary unemployment as the consequence.
In contrast to the low- and medium-skilled segments, the high-skilled labour
market is assumed to be competitive, and there is no involuntary unemployment.
Accounting for unemployment, the three labour markets are balanced by aggrega-
ting, on the demand side, over sectors and, on the supply side, over households of
2The extension of the model to three skill groups with NNCES calibration is described in Boeters
and Feil (2009).
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the respective skill type. With respect to other household characteristics apart from
the skill type, it is assumed that the structure of labour demand is uniform across
sectors.
Government
The main focus of the model is on the complex tax and transfer system for private
households, whose budget constraints are calculated in the microsimulation module
(see Section 2.1). Apart from labour income taxes, the government collects uni-
form capital input taxes, profit taxes, output taxes in production and differentiated
consumption taxes. The government budget encompasses the revenue from all these
taxes, transfers to private households, the public purchases of goods, and the ba-
lance of payments surplus or deficit. In the policy simulations (see Section 4), the
level of public consumption is kept constant and the transfers to private households
are adjusted to ensure that the public budget is in balance.
Foreign Trade
According to the small-open-economy assumption, export and import prices in fo-
reign currency are not affected by the domestic economy. International trade is
modelled adopting the Armington (1969) assumption of product heterogeneity by
market of origin and destination. Domestically produced goods are converted into
specific goods destined for the domestic market and the export market through a
constant-elasticity-of-transformation function. Analogously, a CES function charac-
terises the choice between imported and domestically produced varieties of the same
good. The output of this CES aggregation is used both as intermediate and final
demand. Foreign closure of the model is warranted through the balance-of-payments
constraint.
2.3 Linking the microsimulation and CGE modules
If we had a closed-form formula for individual labour supply, it would in principle
be possible to integrate all equations of the two modules in a single model and try to
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solve it simultaneously. However, as labour supply is simulated with random numbers
(see Section 2.1), the modules must be kept separate and iterated until they produce
a consistent solution. In the policy simulations (Section 5) I start with the modified
rules of the tax and transfer system and first simulate labour supply changes under
the assumption of constant wages and unemployment rates. The resulting labour
supply is aggregated by skill type and transferred to the CGE module, which is
then solved under the assumption of a fixed labour supply. This results in changes
in wages, unemployment rates and transfers to balance the public budget. These
variables are fed back to the labour supply module for the next iteration. This is
continued until the two modules converge.
When linking the wage bargaining equations to the microsimulation module, it is
assumed that all individual households (of the respective skill group) are uniformly
represented by the trade union. Marginal tax rates and the values of employment and
unemployment are calculated as (hours-weighted) averages over all households and
labour supply options. In turn, the wages and unemployment rates that result in the
CGE module are used to derive the income positions of all employed or unemployed
households.
3 Welfare calculations
In previous applications (e.g. Boeters and Feil, 2009), the micro-macro model has
been used only for a descriptive analysis, i.e. for tracing out the consequences of
policy changes for observable economic variables, without any sort of welfare as-
sessment. For the present analysis, the model needs to be extended with a welfare
module. For this purpose, I draw on the work of Creedy and Kalb (2005), adjusted
for the fact that utility of the households is conceptualised as an expected value.
It has been shown in Section 2.1 that the utility function is translog with house-
hold consumption and leisure as arguments. Expected utility, EU , of labour supply
option k for household j of type i is the probability-weighted (pi,n) sum over the uti-
lities in the different labour market states n (employed/unemployed, i.e. two states
for singles, four for couples):
EUj,k =
∑
n
pi,n
(
ai,C (log(Cj,k,n))
2 + β˜i,C log(Cj,k,n) +Rj,k
)
(1)
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In contrast to Section 2.1, 1 focuses only on the terms related to household consump-
tion. ai,C is the coefficient of the quadratic log-consumption term, β˜i,C is the coef-
ficient that collects all terms that are linear in log-consumption (including the in-
teraction terms with leisure), and Rj,k is a residual collecting all terms that do not
depend on consumption at all.
In a discrete choice setting, the calculation of the Hicksian equivalent variation
(EV ) is complicated by the fact that we do not know beforehand which labour-
supply option the household will choose. In the initial situation, household j chooses
option k, providing utility level EUj,k. In the counterfactual situation simulated, it
chooses l, providing utility level E¯U j,l. However, neither k nor l need be the option
it would choose if it were compensated lump-sum (the fiction underlying the EV
calculation) instead of undergoing the actual policy change. Therefore EV must be
calculated for all possible options (indexm). This is done using the following implicit
formula for EV :
E¯U j,l =
∑
n
pi,n
(
ai,C (log(Ci,j,n + EVi,m,n))
2 + β˜i,C log(Ci,j,n + EVi,m,n) +Ri,j
)
Under normal circumstances, option-specific EV will be constant across labour mar-
ket states (EVi,m,n = EVi,m, ∀n). However, a complication arises because for some
households, EV can be negative and larger (in absolute terms) than their consump-
tion in the case of unemployment. This would make the log function undefined. To
avoid this case, I set a lower bound on EVi,m,n, which is slightly above −Ci,j,n, and
allow EVi,m,n to deviate from the other options if it is at its lower bound.
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Individual equivalent variation is the minimum of the option-specific values
(Creedy and Kalb, 2005):
EVj = min
m
(EVj,m)
Finally, the change in total welfare is calculated by summing up all individual EV s.
We can restrict ourselves to the individuals in the micro module, because all other
agents are compensated so that their welfare remains constant (see Section 4).
EV =
∑
j
EVj
3In these cases the non-restricted value of EVi,m,n is selected for the welfare calculations. As
only a few households are affected, the overall welfare results are not sensitive to this assumption.
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By taking the unweighted sum of the EV s as welfare measure, I adopt the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion of potential compensation. If total EV is positive, the winners of
the tax reform could compensate the losers. The principal caveat of this criterion is
that as long as no actual compensation takes place, distributional aspects do matter,
but are not accounted for. It would be desirable to apply some distributional weigh-
ting to the EV changes, at least as a sensitivity analysis. However, this runs into
the problem that the utility functions are inherently incommensurable, because the
parameters vary by household. Therefore, no straightforward basis for weighting is
available. Aaberge and Colombino (2008) propose a weighting method that involves
two diverging utility functions per household. I do not adopt this approach in the
present paper because of the consistency problems implied.
4 Scenario definition
In the micro module of the linked model, the budget constraint is characterised
for each household by the average burden and one or two marginal burdens (for
single and couple households respectively) per labour-supply option. These burdens
summarise the complete tax and transfer system, they comprise the income tax,
social security contributions and, possibly, transfer payments. In the simulations,
the conditions (though not the incidence) of the latter are kept fixed and the income
tax schedule is varied.
According to the German income tax schedule, the marginal tax rate is increasing
in taxable income, with two different slope parameters up to a certain threshold
income, and constant thereafter. The average tax rate is monotonously increasing
in taxable income as well, asymptotically approaching the highest marginal tax rate
for very high incomes (see Figure 1).
In the simulations, I gradually increase the progressivity of the tax schedule. The
marginal tax rate is raised by the same number of percentage points everywhere
(shift from initial to scenario in Figure 1). To compensate the increase in tax
income that would result from an isolated increase in the marginal tax rates, I
introduce a uniform transfer paid to each working individual. These two changes are
combined to a new average tax schedule, which is first below, then above the initial
10
Figure 1: German income tax schedule (2005)
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one. Figure 1 shows the case of a 6 percentage-points increase of the marginal tax
rates as scenario. This is the change that turns out to be optimal in the base case
simulations of Section 5. In this scenario, the budget-balancing transfer amounts to
1416 euros per year (118 euros per month). With this transfer in place, the reform
is favourable for single households with a taxable income of below 30,000 euros,
whereas households with a higher income lose.4
The welfare assessment in the scenarios is slightly complicated by the fact that
the worker households with flexible labour supply are not the only households in
the model (see Section 2.2, households). The residual worker household and the
capitalist household are also affected by the reform, through changing wages and
returns to capital respectively. As utility functions that allow us to evaluate wel-
fare changes are only defined for households in the microsimulation module, further
adjustment parameters are introduced to restrict welfare changes to this group.
Lump-sum transfers are adjusted in order to keep real income of the residual hou-
seholds is kept precisely at its initial value. When evaluating welfare changes, we
4Here I assume that earnings do not change. They do change in the model, where wages are
endogenous.
11
Figure 2: Welfare effects of varying tax progressivity
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can then focus on the households in the microsimulation module when evaluating
welfare changes.
5 Simulation results
The simulation set-up described in Section 4 produces welfare effects that are concave
in tax progressivity. Welfare is maximised at marginal tax rates that are 6 percentage
points above the initial level. Figure 2 shows the welfare profile, Figure 1 (scenario)
the tax schedule at the maximum point.
Figure 2 also illustrates that a relatively large number of random numbers is
necessary to produce a smooth shape of the curve. Curves with 100 random error
terms per individual (broken lines) show a lot of non-concave segments and are vola-
tile. Only with 1000 random numbers (the average of the 10 cases with 100 numbers
shown in bold), is the curve sufficiently smooth for a single, global maximum to
be discerned. Even in the case of 1000 random numbers, perfect convexity is not
reached yet, and we had better describe the welfare maximum as being somewhere
between a 5- and an 8-percentage-point increase of the marginal tax rates.
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Figure 3: Distribution of welfare effects across households
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The aggregate equivalent variation (EV ) reached in this region is approxima-
tely 500 million euros per year. Given that the microsimulation module represents
roughly 21 million people, this amounts to 24 euros per person per year, or 2 euros
per month. This is a small amount compared to the redistribution that is taking
place at the same time. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the welfare effects across
households at the maximum point (where marginal tax rates are 6 percentage points
higher). There is a large variation with EV ranging from a loss of more than 300
euros to a gain of almost 200 euros. The distribution is skewed, the tail with the
losses is thicker, and the median is at approximately 18 euros, considerably more
than the average of 2 euros.
Is it possible to identify the model mechanisms that are responsible for the
average welfare gain on top of all the redistribution that is taking place? Let us look
at a number of model outcomes in order to get a feeling for what drives the results.
To begin with, Figure 4 shows the changes in labour supply (total hours, i.e. both
at the intensive and extensive margin).
The labour supply effects differ qualitatively across skill groups. For the low
skilled, labour supply increases with the degree of tax progressivity, for the medium
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Figure 4: Labour supply by skill group
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skilled it decreases slightly, for the high skilled considerably so. The reaction of each
skill group is almost linear. For comparison the curves with the addition linear
extrapolate the effect of the first percentage point change linearly. For all skill groups
the deviation from the linear curve is negative, i.e. with high progressivity there is
a more than linear disincentive to work. We will see that this is the driving force
behind the results; but to obtain a clear picture, we continue our analysis of the
results.
Next, we break the labour supply effects down into changes along the hours-of-
work and the participation margins (Figures 5 and 6). Hours of work decrease for
all skill groups, the differences between skill groups are small and the deviations
from the linear responses are not uniform. Participation increases for all groups,
the differences among groups are considerably larger than for hours of work, and
the deviations from the linear schedule are always negative. For the low skilled,
the participation effect dominates the hours-of-work effect, whereas the latter do-
minates for the two other skill groups. The participation effect is largest for the
low skilled because in this group, participation is lowest from the start, hence there
are considerably more indiviuals left who can be activated by higher labour supply
incentives.
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Figure 5: Hours-of-work effects by skill group
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Figure 6: Participation effects by skill group
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Figure 7: Wage changes by skill group
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Next, we take a look at wages and unemployment rates. Figure 7 shows the
change in skill-specific wages. The wage reaction to tax progressivity is characteris-
tically different depending on the skill group. The wages of the high skilled increases,
whereas the medium skilled and particularly the low skilled suffer a wage drop. It
is not possible to infer the causal direction of the interaction between the labour
market variables from a simple inspection of the figures. However, the skill-specific
wage reactions may be interpreted as a consequence of the changes in labour supply
(Figure 4), which are attenuated, but not reversed, by the wage changes.
Figure 8 shows unemployment for the medium and low skilled. (The high skilled
are fully employed by assumption). The figure reveals that the unemployment reac-
tion is almost linear and almost proportional to initial unemployment rates. Since
for the low skilled the initial unemployment rate (22%) is far higher than for the
medium skilled (7%), unemployment changes, when measured in percentage points,
are highest in this segment as well.
Finally, we turn to total labour input to production. Given that we have changes
both in labour supply and unemployment  which is the overall effect on labour
input (in wage-weighted hours)? Of particular interest are the medium skilled (the
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Figure 8: Unemployment by skill group
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largest group), where both labour supply and unemployment are decreasing, so that
the overall effect is unclear. Figure 9 shows that the net effect for the medium skilled
is positive and slightly increasing in tax progressivity. Labour input of the low skilled
increases considerably, whereas it falls for the high skilled. A wage-weighted average
of all labour-input changes (bold line total) almost precisely coincides with the
curve for the medium skilled, with an increase that remains below half a per cent.
Figure 10 shows the transfer that is paid to compensate the wage income re-
cipients for the higher marginal wage tax (so that the public budget is kept in
balance). This transfer increases almost linearly with the change of the marginal tax
rate to more than 200 euros per month. As a benchmark, a linear extrapolation of
the change at the first one per cent increase is depicted in Figure 10 as Transfer (li-
near). The actual transfer is slightly less than linear, and it turns out to be exactly
this deviation that leads to the welfare maximum in the model. At an 11-percentage-
point increase of the marginal tax rate, the deviation from the linear development
is approximately 5 euros per month, in the region of the welfare maximum, it is
approximately 1 euro per month.
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Figure 9: Total labour input (weighted hours)
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Figure 10: Lump-sum transfer to balance public budget
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How is it possible to proceed from the observation of non-linear model reactions
to the identification of the driving forces? In order to find out the causal direc-
tion of the effects, I run a number of diagnostic scenarios. First, I implement the
line Transfer (linear) from Figure 10 as a scenario, i.e. I compensate individuals
with the linear extrapolation of the first incremental transfer, neglecting the bud-
get constraint. In this simulation the welfare maximum disappears (at least within
the region covered), and, instead, welfare increases monotonously with tax progres-
sivity. This identifies the non-linearity in the transfer as a crucial element in the
determination of the welfare maximum.
What then is the cause of the non-linearity in the transfer? The next identifica-
tion step is to check whether the initial impulse comes from the micro or the macro
part of the model. The second diagnostic scenario therefore consists in linearising
the macro module, by feeding the linear reactions of wages (Figure 7) and unemploy-
ment (Figure 8) back into the micro module. This does not eliminate the non-linear
reactions of labour supply (Figure 4). In contrast, when I linearise the micro module
and feed linear reactions in labour supply (Figures 5 and 6) back into the macro
module, the non-linearities in wages and transfers almost entirely disappear. This
identifies the micro module as the source of the initial effect.
With regard to the labour supply reactions produced by the micro module (Fi-
gures 5 and 6), we have already found participation (Figures 6) to be the dominating
factor. How can we explain that participation  while increasing monotonously for all
skill groups  increases less than linearly? The reason lies in the probability distribu-
tion assumed in the logit labour supply model. The individual, unobservable utility
components of the different labour supply options  here we focus on the option
non-participation  are extreme-value distributed. The extreme-value distribution
is, similar to the normal distribution, single-peaked, and its density decreases the
greater the distance from zero. Small changes in the attractiveness of one labour
supply option will thus have a larger effect when they are close to the initial si-
tuation (at zero) than when they are farther away. This is the non-linearity that
eventually drives the results.
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6 Sensitivity analysis
In the sensitivity analysis of the results, I vary the basic model set-up in three
places: elasticity of labour supply, elasticity of the wage curve with respect to tax
progressivity, and international capital mobility. The first two of these variations are
backed up with straightforward economic intuitions. When labour supply becomes
more elastic, we expect the welfare loss through labour supply distortions to increase
and thus tax progressivity to become less attractive. Conversely, when the wage
curve reacts more sensitively to higher tax progressivity, the contribution of tax
progressivity to reducing labour market distortions resulting from collective wage
bargaining is more significant, and tax progressivity becomes more attractive. In
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 I investigate whether the model results confirm these intuitions,
and what this means in quantitative terms. In Section 6.3, I turn to the degree of
international capital mobility, which has proved to be an important driving force of
the results in earlier applications of PACE-L (see Boeters and Feil, 2009). In this
case, we have no a priori expectation about the direction of the effect, however.
6.1 Variation in labour supply elasticities
The elasticity of labour supply is an obvious candidate for sensitivity analysis, be-
cause it governs the distortions in labour supply, which constitute one side of the
trade-off we are exploring. However, the elasticity of labour supply is not a single
parameter in the model that could easily be varied. Rather, it results from the in-
teraction of all individual parameters in the utility functions, which determine the
relative attractiveness of leisure versus consumption. None of these parameters can
easily be singled out for variation.
As a practical solution, I vary all parameters that are connected with leisure in
the utility functions (linear, quadratic and interaction terms with other variables)
with the same multiplier. It turns out that this almost exactly translates into pro-
portional changes of labour supply elasticities. A multiplier of 0.9 leads to approxi-
mately 10% lower labour supply elasticities (columns Low elast. in Table 1), a
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Table 1: Labour supply elasticities
Participation Hours of work
Low Base High Low Base High
elast. case elast. elast. case elast.
Singles 0.045 0.051 0.055 0.011 0.012 0.013
Low skilled 0.068 0.076 0.084 0.007 0.010 0.011
Medium skilled 0.046 0.052 0.056 0.011 0.013 0.014
High skilled 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.010 0.012 0.013
Women in couples 0.056 0.060 0.066 0.025 0.028 0.030
Low skilled 0.047 0.046 0.054 0.008 0.009 0.008
Medium skilled 0.053 0.059 0.064 0.027 0.029 0.032
High skilled 0.086 0.096 0.106 0.047 0.052 0.057
Men in couples 0.026 0.029 0.032 0.006 0.007 0.008
Low skilled 0.042 0.046 0.053 0.004 0.006 0.007
Medium skilled 0.028 0.032 0.034 0.006 0.007 0.008
High skilled 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009
All 0.040 0.044 0.048 0.013 0.015 0.016
Low skilled 0.052 0.056 0.064 0.007 0.008 0.009
Medium skilled 0.041 0.046 0.050 0.013 0.015 0.016
High skilled 0.028 0.031 0.034 0.017 0.019 0.021
multiplier of 1.1 to elasticities that are 10% higher than in the base case (columns
High elast.).5
Figure 11 shows the welfare effects. As expected, the lower labour supply elas-
ticities, the higher welfare gains from higher tax progressivity, with corresponding
shifts of the welfare maximum. When labour supply elasticities are low, maximum
welfare is reached at marginal tax rates that are 10 percentage points higher than
5Labour supply elasticities have been simulated by increasing all gross wages simultaneously
by 10% and then aggregating over individual discrete reactions. Interaction effects are very small,
thus this yields almost the same results as varying wages separately group by group.
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Figure 11: Varying labour supply elasticity: welfare
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in the initial situation, when elasticities are high, the maximum is at tax rates that
are 5 percentage points higher.6
Figures 12 and 13 show the actions of the underlying labour market variables.
For the largest group, the medium skilled, effects are clear-cut. With higher labour
supply elasticity, the negative labour supply effects of the base case are amplified,
which leads to a higher wage. For the low and high skilled (which are considerably
smaller groups), the patterns are less clear-cut. There is hardly any change in low
skilled labour supply and high skilled wages, due to interaction effects with the other
skill groups.
In the sensitivity analysis, labour supply elasticities have only been varied in
a narrow range (±10 %), less than the variation that can be found in empirical
estimates. This restriction was deliberate, since I wanted to keep the welfare maxi-
mum in the range covered by the simulations of the base case. Further simulations
confirmed what can be expected by extrapolating from Figure 11. If labour supply
6The calculations in the sensitivity analysis are based on simulations with 100 sets of random
error terms. For this purpose, a set is chosen that produces aggregate results similar to the extended
1000-error-terms set in Section 5. Nevertheless, curve ELS = mid in Figure 11 does not exactly
coincide with the one in Figure 2.
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Figure 12: Varying labour supply elasticity: labour supply
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Figure 13: Varying labour supply elasticity: wage
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elasticities are even lower, then the welfare effect is monotonously increasing over
the full range of marginal tax rates, if they are higher, the curve is monotonously
decreasing.
6.2 Variation in wage curve elasticities
Similar to the case of labour supply elasticities, we can make an informed guess about
what would happen if the wage bargaining system (represented by wage curves)
reacted more or less sensitively to a variation of tax progressivity. As the positive
effect of tax progressivity is reducing unemployment by exerting downward pressure
on wages, the welfare effects of tax progressivity are expected to be the more positive,
the more sensitively the wages react.
However, again similar to the case of labour supply elasticities, there is no free
parameter in the model that directly governs the responsiveness of the wage to
variations in tax progressivity (or other institutional parameters). The latter is the
result of the integrated wage bargaining system, whose only parameter, the relative
bargaining power of the trade unions, has been fixed in the calibration so that the
actual level of unemployment is met. There is no other parameter that could be
varied to systematically modify the responsiveness of the wage bargaining system
to changes in labour market conditions.
In this sensitivity analysis, I use a modelling shortcut and make the bargaining
strength parameter a linear function of tax progressivity. In the high elasticity
(EWC=high) scenario, bargaining strength of the trade union decreases in tax
progressivity, so that the wage drops more than in the base case with a constant
bargaining parameter (and vice versa for the low elasticity scenario). The linear
parameter is chosen so that in the high (low) elasticity scenario the responsiveness
of the wage curve to tax progressivity is 25% higher (lower) than in the base case.
The resulting wage curve elasticities (per cent change in wages as a reaction to a one
percentage point increase of the marginal tax rate, holding average taxes constant)
are shown in Table 2.7
7These elasticities have been simulated as general equilibrium reactions to a one percentage
point increase of the marginal tax rates at fixed labour supply (but all other economic variables
endogenously adjusting). As there is no wage bargaining for the high skilled, they are excluded
from the table.
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Table 2: Wage curve elasticities
Low Base High
elast. case elast.
Low skilled -0.233 -0.311 -0.389
Medium skilled -0.179 -0.239 -0.299
Figure 14: Varying wage curve elasticity: welfare
-0.4
-0.2
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12
W
el
fa
re
 c
ha
ng
e 
(ag
gre
ga
te 
EV
 in
 bl
n. 
eu
ros
)
Increase in marginal tax on labour (percentage points)
EWC = low EWC = mid EWC = high
Welfare reacts to these variations in wage curve elasticities as expected. With
more (less) elastic wage curves, the welfare gains of additional tax progressivity are
higher (lower). For the values chosen in the sensitivity analysis, optimal tax pro-
gression turns out to be at 8 percentage points (higher elasticity) and 5 percentage
points (lower elasticity) above the initial level.
In the case of wage curve elasticities, the core labour market variables closely
follow the variation in the wage curve. Higher wage curve elasticities translate into
lower wages and higher employment for both the medium and low skilled. Again, the
range of variation in the elasticity values is chosen deliberately so that the maxima
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of the welfare curve remain within the range covered by the numerical simulations.
Higher (lower) elasticity values outside this range lead to a welfare curve that is
monotonously increasing (decreasing).
6.3 Variation in international capital mobility
In contrast to labour supply and wage curve elasticities, international capital mobi-
lity is not directly linked to the mechanisms that determine optimal tax progressivity.
Therefore, we have no clear hypothesis in which direction a change in capital mobi-
lity would drive the results. From other simulations with PACE-L (Boeters and Feil,
2009), however, we know that international capital mobility is in fact important to
the outcomes. In addition, this mechanism is particularly suited to demonstrate the
general usefulness of the linkage approach. The role of capital mobility would not
be taken into account if we limited ourselves to a partial labour market approach.
In the base case of Section 5, international capital mobility is calibrated to em-
pirical parameters from French and Poterba (1991) and de Mooij and Ederveen
(2001). The core parameter is the elasticity of foreign capital supply with respect
to the domestic interest rate (ECS), which is set to 2.4. Figure 15 shows the wel-
fare effects of the policy reform for the base case and two variants, where capital
supply elasticity is varied by 25 % around its base value (ECS = 1.8 and ECS =
3.0 respectively). It turns out that the welfare maximum shifts to the right with
increasing capital mobility. With low international capital mobility (ECS = 1.8),
the maximum is at + 4 %-p., with high capital mobility (ECS = 3.0) at + 9 %-p.8
Why is an increase in tax progressivity more favourable when the degree of
international capital mobility is high? To understand this effect, one must recall
from Section 5 that higher tax progressivity increases total labour input in the
economy (Figure 9). Higher labour input means  complications due to the different
substitutability of the skill groups with capital aside  more attractive conditions
for internationally mobile capital, which is reflected in an increasing rental rate of
capital. The more mobile capital internationally, the more these attractive conditions
8I also ran scenarios with even lower or higher elasticities. Then there is no more inner maximum
in the range covered by the simulations, and we have a monotonous welfare curve instead.
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Figure 15: Varying capital mobility: welfare
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Figure 16: Varying capital mobility: return to capital
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Figure 17: Varying capital mobility: wages
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translate into an increase in the domestic capital stock and the more is the increase
in the rental rate attenuated (Figure 16).
The differences in international capital inflow translate into differences in the
resulting wages (see Figure 17), which in turn drive the welfare results. The largest
effect, which also dominates the welfare changes, is on the wage of the high skilled.
The wage of the medium skilled is virtually unaffected, while the wage of the low
skilled, who are substitutes with capital rather than complements, are even slightly
decreasing in capital mobility.
7 Conclusions
What is the optimal degree of income tax progressivity when both labour supply and
wages are endogenous, and households are heterogeneous in several dimensions? This
question is answered using a numerical combined micro-macro model. The micro part
features approximately 4600 individual households with varying wages and labour
supply reactions. The macro part includes sectoral collective wage bargaining and
involuntary unemployment. Thus the fundamental trade-off created by increasing
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tax progressivity is captured. On the one hand, higher marginal tax rates distort
individual labour supply. On the other hand, higher tax progressivity has a wage-
moderating and unemployment-reducing effect under collective wage bargaining.
In this general setting, varying tax progressivity is implemented as a stepwise
one-percentage-point increase of the marginal wage income tax and a compensating
transfer to all working individuals, which keeps the public budget balanced. The
most important simulation results are the following:
• A welfare maximum is reached at a point where marginal income tax rates are
six percentage points above the initial level.
• The welfare gain at this point averages a moderate two euros per household
and per month.
• This average welfare gain is overshadowed by considerable redistributive ef-
fects, which range from a loss of more than 300 euros to a gain of almost 200
euros.
• Labour supply effects of higher tax progressivity are positive at the participa-
tion margin and negative at the hours-of-work margin. The net effect varies
by skill group; it is positive for the low skilled, but negative for the medium
and high skilled.
• At the same time higher tax progressivity reduces the unemployment rate. This
effect dominates, so that overall labour input to production (in wage-weighted
hours of work) increases.
These results have been subject to a sensitivity analysis in three dimensions:
• The more elastic the labour supply, the lower the optimal degree of tax pro-
gressivity. This is plausible because, with higher elasticity of labour supply,
the distortive effect of higher tax progressivity at the hours-of-work margin is
larger.
• The more elastic the wage curve with respect to the marginal tax rates, the
higher the optimal degree of tax progressivity. If the wage curve reacts strongly
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to the marginal tax rate, higher tax progressivity has a large corrective effect
on the labour market distortion caused by wages above market clearing, which
increases welfare.
• The more mobile capital is internationally, the higher the optimal degree of
tax progressivity. This is because higher tax progressivity attracts capital to
the domestic market, the more so the higher capital mobility.
Given the small size of the average welfare effect (two euros per household per
month), the results can certainly not be interpreted as supporting a strong efficiency-
based claim in favour of more tax progressivity. It makes more sense to interpret
the results the other way round: Since the average efficiency effects are that small,
there is scope for distributional considerations. Whatever distributional goal the
government or a particular political party tries to attain by an adjustment of tax
progressivity, they are not likely to be overridden by efficiency effects that put public
budget balance in danger. This conclusion is warranted within the range covered by
the simulations, i.e. from the current degree of progressivity up to marginal tax rates
for all individuals that are roughly ten percentage points higher than the current
ones.
Although the model of this paper has been designed to contain the features most
relevant to an assessment of tax progressivity, some aspects have not been covered.
These must be kept in mind when interpreting the results. First and foremost, the
model, while lending itself to a descriptive distributional analysis, does not allow
for distributive weighting in the welfare function. This is because welfare weights
cannot be set non-arbitrarily as long as we have incommensurable utility functions
per household. (See the discussion at the end of Section 3.)
Second, there are only relatively few labour supply options in the discrete-choice
set-up (a maximum of five options per individual). The effect of the number of
options on the results is not clear-cut (see Aaberge et al., 2006). However, one might
conjecture that more and finer labour supply options facilitate the switching from
one option to another, because the critical utility differential necessary for a switch
is lower. This might aggravate the distortionary effects on labour supply. On the
other hand, with only a few options the effect conditional on the less likely switch
is larger, hence the difficulty to draw general conclusions.
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Finally, if we compare the model with the real situation in Germany, the match
is not perfect. In reality, we have a uniform income tax for all types of income. In
contrast, the simulations assume that the change in income tax progressivity applies
only to labour income. Given the set-up of the model, this is a reasonable assumption.
The model is not suited to analyse the effects of capital income tax changes, because
it does not include the long-run effects on domestic capital formation. Analysing
such effects would require a model as presented by Conesa et al. (2009). The fiction
underlying the simulations in the present paper is thus a dual income tax, which
treats labour and capital income separately. While this idea has been proposed as
a considerable improvement compared to a unitary income tax (German Council of
Economic Experts, 2008), one needs to keep in mind that it is a deviation from the
actual situation in Germany.
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Appendix
A.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3: Discrete weekly working hours by household types
Individual Hours options
Men, married or single without children 0 38 49
Men, single with children 0 15 30 38 49
Women, single 0 15 30 38 49
Women, married 0 9.5 24 38 47
Table 4: Characteristics of skill groups in GSOEP
Low Medium High
skilled* skilled skilled* All
Number of individuals 854 3016 761 4631
Share in dataset, unweighted (%) 18.44 65.13 16.43 100.00
Share in dataset, weighted (%) 15.82 68.24 15.94 100.00
Singles
Share in skill group, weighted (%) 38.16 32.88 37.96 34.52
Women in couples
Share in skill group, weighted (%) 37.49 33.89 23.09 32.74
Men in couples
Share in skill group, weighted (%) 24.35 33.23 38.95 32.74
Participation
Participation rate, weighted (%) 70.71 79.97 91.25 80.30
Share in total participation, weighted (%) 13.93 67.95 18.12 100.00
Average hours per worker, weighted 35.55 37.55 39.87 37.69
Share in total hours, weighted (%) 13.14 67.70 19.16 100.00
Average gross wage per hour, weighted (euros) 11.70 13.38 18.37 14.12
Share in total wage bill, weighted (%) 10.89 64.17 24.93 100.00
*Low skilled: no formal education completed, high skilled: tertiary education completed
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A.2 Estimation results from the microsimulation model
Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates for single females
Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income -6.44 1.85 -3.48 0.001
Net household income^2 0.43 0.08 5.22 0.000
Net hh income X leisure 0.48 0.30 1.63 0.103
Leisure X East Germany -0.96 0.29 -3.32 0.001
Leisure X nationality 0.23 0.41 0.57 0.566
Leisure 77.59 14.10 5.50 0.000
Leisure^2 -9.96 1.80 -5.55 0.000
Leisure X age -1.11 0.31 -3.65 0.000
Leisure X age^2 0.10 0.04 2.42 0.016
Leisure^2 X age 0.59 0.12 4.83 0.000
Leisure X handicapped -0.17 0.90 -0.18 0.853
Leisure X children < 6 years 4.99 0.60 8.32 0.000
Leisure X children 7-16 years 1.50 0.35 4.29 0.000
Leisure X children >=17 years -0.48 0.31 -1.53 0.127
Dummy for employment -2.13 0.25 -8.67 0.000
Number of obs. 540
Log Likelihood -636.0
Conditional logit with five hours-of-work options (0, 15, 30, 38,
49), GSOEP 1999
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Table 6: Maximum likelihood estimates for single males
Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income 6.76 2.73 2.48 0.013
Net household income^2 -0.019 0.10 -0.19 0.848
Net hh income X leisure -1.42 0.44 -3.21 0.001
Leisure 169.71 20.03 8.47 0.000
Leisure^2 -21.13 2.60 -8.12 0.000
Leisure X East Germany -0.05 0.33 -0.15 0.881
Leisure X nationality 0.29 0.48 0.60 0.547
Leisure X age -0.74 0.32 -2.34 0.019
Leisure X age^2 0.41 0.12 3.35 0.001
Leisure^2 X age 0.06 0.04 1.46 0.143
Leisure X handicapped 1.32 0.83 1.60 0.110
Dummy for employment -9.96 1.13 -8.78 0.000
Number of obs. 952
Log Likelihood -1286.7
Conditional logit with five hours-of-work options (0, 15, 30,
38, 49), GSOEP 1999
37
Table 7: Maximum likelihood estimates for couples
Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income 8.95 5.11 1.75 0.080
Net household income^2 -0.003 0.26 -0.01 0.989
Net hh income X leisure of male spouse -1.46 0.42 -3.46 0.001
Net hh income X leisure of female spouse -0.43 0.38 -1.14 0.253
Net hh income X nationality -6.92 3.82 -1.81 0.070
Net hh income^2 X nationality 0.56 0.27 2.09 0.036
Net hh income X East Germany 5.50 1.87 2.94 0.003
Net hh income^2 X East Germany -0.49 0.14 -3.37 0.001
Leisure of male spouse 56.72 7.15 7.94 0.000
Leisure of male spouse^2 -4.06 0.47 -8.66 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X nationality -0.40 0.41 -0.98 0.328
Leisure of male spouse X East Germany -6.05 2.80 -2.16 0.031
Leisure of male spouse X age -0.36 0.08 -4.31 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X age^2 0.48 0.10 4.99 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X handicapped 0.76 0.72 1.06 0.290
Leisure of female spouse 79.98 7.00 11.43 0.000
Leisure of female spouse^2 -8.40 0.53 -15.77 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X nationality 0.27 0.40 0.67 0.501
Leisure of female spouse X East Germany -7.10 2.59 -2.74 0.006
Leisure of female spouse X age -0.39 0.09 -4.18 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X age^2 0.58 0.11 5.26 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X handicapped 0.97 0.71 1.36 0.175
Leisure of female spouse X children < 6 years 4.63 0.31 14.98 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X children 7-16 years 2.13 0.22 9.59 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X children >=17 years -0.56 0.22 -2.56 0.011
Leisure of male spouse X Leisure of female spouse -1.50 0.55 -2.72 0.006
Leisure of male spouse
X Leisure of female spouse X nationality 0.26 0.14 1.78 0.075
Leisure of male spouse
X Leisure of female spouse X East Germany 1.03 0.70 1.47 0.142
Dummy for employment of female spouse -2.55 0.25 -10.09 0.000
Dummy for employment of both spouses 0.61 0.24 2.54 0.011
Number of obs. 1910
Log Likelihood -4186.1
Conditional logit with fifteen hours-of-work options (female spouse: 0, 9.5, 24, 38, 47;
male spouse: 0, 38, 49), GSOEP 1999
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